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EVIDENCE FOR POLICY MAKING: THREE PARADIGMS 
Graham Room, University of Bath 




How can public policy-makers make good decisions? What counts as a good decision? And having 
made and implemented it, how can policy-makers check just how good it proved to be?   
The most common answer nowadays is that policy decisions, to be good, should be evidence-
based. First, it is only such policies that are likely to be effective. Second, with evidence to back 
them up, they can expect to command public support.1 
Evidence-based policy-making (EBPM) became fashionable as part of the ‘modernising’ agenda 
with which Labour came into office in 1997. It was portrayed as the contemporary expression of the 
long-standing ambition, to bring scientific rationality to public affairs. For Labour, EBPM meant 
challenging established customs and vested interests with the demand for evidence of ‘what 
works’: it also meant abandoning ideology.  
The Coalition government retained that commitment after 2010, with the launch of a network of 
‘What Works’ evidence centres for social policy. The Behavioural Insights Unit in the Cabinet Office 
has been playing a central role. One of their collaborators has been Ben Goldacre, well known 
through his Guardian columns on ‘Bad Science’. He has in particular been a champion of 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) in social policy.  But the practitioner of good science does well 
to know and remember the history of his or her subject.   
It seems often to be assumed that the application of RCTs to social policy is something new.  Not 
so. At least as far back as Lyndon Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programmes of the 1960s, 
sociologists were grappling with the question: how could rigorous experimental design be applied 
to the testing of novel interventions - interventions which were taking place in the real world, in 
complex social and political contexts.  
Marris and Rein (1974) provide the classic review of those efforts. Another of the US sociologists 
who got involved was Donald Campbell (1969). In subsequent years he provided one of the 
standard texts on ‘quasi-experimentation’: how to remain rigorous even under the limitations of 
practical research and evaluation (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Years later it was after him that the 
Campbell Collaboration was named: applying to social policy interventions the protocols of 
systematic review that the Cochrane Collaboration had pioneered in the medical field.   
Good science also means thinking about the variety of concepts and methods to hand, and which 
to use in different situations. Which concepts and methods work best in relation to which research 
questions and problems? This is a form of meta-thinking. What follows suggests three alternative 
paradigms for assessing ‘what works’.    
 
2. EBPM AS THE DISAGGREGATION OF IMPACT 
The advocates of EBPM have been concerned, first and foremost, with evidence of the outcome or 
impact of a particular intervention. Evidence is collected, evaluated and aggregated – 
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 The alternative to evidence-based policy making – and the implied target of its critical thrust – is not always clear.  It 
certainly however encompasses policies and practices that reflect political loyalties, professional self-aggrandisement or 
the pressure of lobbyists.  
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‘systematically reviewed’ - across as wide a range of contexts as possible. This is meant to 
produce a rigorous assessment of ‘what works’ - and in some degree an understanding of how 
delivery can be adjusted to a variety of conditions.   
The gold standard of EBPM remains the randomised controlled trial. It is to this that policy makers 
and their public critics regularly appeal (see for example HM Treasury (2011) para 9.16; Johnson 
(2011)).  There is a well-defined intervention which has a measurable impact on the target 
population in question. This intervention is administered to a ‘treatment’ group and the effects are 
compared with those for a ‘control’ group.  A clear and straightforward example is provided in the 
Cabinet Office document, Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy with Randomised 
Controlled Trials (Haynes et al., 2012), from which Figure 1 is taken.     
 
 




This approach to EBPM is variously elaborated and criticised in the policy literature. Much of the 
discussion involves relaxing the severe demands of the RCT, successively abandoning one or 
more of its defining elements and making do with quasi-experimental and descriptive studies 
(Pawson, 2006: Box 3.2). Campbell himself was central to the development of such ‘softer’ 
methodologies and the assessment of their utility. Even then however, some minimum threshold of 
rigour must be retained, so as to be able to establish ‘what works’ with sufficient certainty.  
In practice of course any new policy is launched into a world already crowded with policy initiatives, 
ancient and modern, whose effects and impacts interact. Nevertheless, if we make some 
simplifying assumptions, appropriate statistical methods are available with which we can, in 
principle, partition and disaggregate these effects and isolate the contribution of any particular 
intervention. Such methods can thus disentangle the combined effects of multiple interventions, 
against the background of a changing environment. That, at least, is what is commonly maintained 
(see for example Harkness et al (2009)). 
We might capture these key elements of EBPM through Figure 2. The independent variables X1, 
X2 and X3 correspond to the interventions that are simultaneously under way and that (in part 
through their effect on Z) affect the impact variable Y. Each of these can vary (albeit within some 








The real world is rarely so simple. Variables exert their effects within different timescales; there 
may be threshold and ratchet effects; impact may not increase in strict proportion to the 
independent variables. Econometric techniques exist for handling some of these complications, so 
that it is still possible to separate out the effects of these various interventions (Room and Brown, 
2013).  Nevertheless, to separate them in this way is more than just a technical matter. It carries an 
implicit ontology of the social world, as one that can be disaggregated into a set of independent 
‘variables’ that additively compose this world’s causal mechanisms. Epistemologically 
sophisticated methodologies are here being used to trump ontological complexity.   
 
3. THE ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE OF REALISM 
Pawson (2006) questions the language of ‘impact’ as far as social policy interventions are 
concerned. He insists that such interventions do not so much ‘impact’ upon social actors as 
‘engage’ with them: both the ‘street level bureaucrats’ who deliver the interventions and the 
members of the target population. Such actors learn by doing; if allowed to do so, and given a 
degree of freedom, they may well improve on the policy maker’s design.  But of course, they also 
have their own agendas: they may contest the goals of the intervention and subvert it to their own 
ends.   
The intervention in question is therefore likely to take different forms in the hands of different 
stakeholders and in different institutional contexts: we can hardly speak of the ‘standard’ form of 
the intervention and its effectiveness, without regard to these active subjects. Evaluation of the 
intervention therefore involves laying out the variety of forms that it takes – and with what effects – 
under these different contingencies.   
On the basis of this critique, Pawson offers a response in terms of ‘realism’, as developed by 
philosophers of science such as Harré (1972: Ch 4). Realism insists that it is not enough to 
establish by appropriate statistical techniques the correlations of independent and dependent 
variables – the central concern of Figure 2. Explanation must also include an account of the real 
world processes which produce and underpin the patterns we observe.2 Ontology matters: it 
cannot be entirely dodged by using epistemologically sophisticated methodologies.   
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 Pawson repeatedly speaks of this as the development of theory and models – our imagining of the generative processes 








For Harré, these ‘generative mechanisms’ involve potentialities that are unlocked or closed down 
by different contextual conditions. Explosives such as gunpowder and dynamite provide the 
example that Harré and his followers commonly cite, including Pawson. The chemical composition 
of the explosive provides the capacity to explode: but whether it does so or not depends on such 
factors as the absence of damp, the presence of oxygen, the ambient temperature, etc. Causal 
analysis of generative mechanisms and policy impacts must be alert to such contingencies.   
Pawson spells out the methodological implications. Causal analysis is an ‘explanatory quest’, 
whose goal is to disentangle and peel away these contingencies. As we do this, we will develop a 
cumulative understanding of the interventions in question and how they are likely to behave in 
different situations. 
Figure 3 offers a visualisation of this process (albeit the diagram is ours, not Pawson’s). An 
intervention A can, depending on the conditions of its implementation, take form A1 or A2; and 
depending on further contingencies, may then take the form A11, A12, A21 or A22.  The Figure 
tells us that A12 was the form taken in a given instance; but asks us, in a realist spirit, to peel away 
and reveal the contingencies that came successively into play and the other possibilities that might 
have been realised.              
 




Nevertheless, this still leaves Pawson focussing primarily on the individual intervention – whether 
gunpowder or a new pharmaceutical product or a social policy programme - and unpicking the 
contingent factors that activate or inhibit its impact. We now seek to go beyond this, to the crowded 
real world of multiple and interacting policy initiatives. 
  
4. THE CASE FOR TRANSFORMATIVE REALISM 
Figure 3 is a tree diagram - a dendrogram - with successively sprouting branches and sub-
branches.  It is therefore reminiscent of Darwin’s ‘Tree of Life’, as reproduced in Figure 4 (Darwin, 
1859). In his account of the diversification of species, Darwin was centrally concerned with 
                                                                                                                                                                                
liable themselves to be modified (page 100). They also provide a mental model of the world, by which decision-makers 





















processes of adaptation to the successive contingencies of different habitats, just as Pawson’s 
realism exposes the successive contingencies which shape a policy intervention and its effects.    
 
Figure 4:   Darwin’s Tree of Life 
 
 
Nevertheless, Darwin also referred to the co-evolution of species: albeit not perhaps to the same 
extent as his successors, who have shown how powerfully the dynamic synergies of co-evolution 
shape the evolutionary story (Kauffman, 1993; Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 2000).  Such co-
evolution typically involves populations that are far removed from each other in the evolutionary 
tree: for example, flowers and insects, mutually favouring each other’s ‘struggle for existence’ over 
the last 140 million years.  
It is interactions of this sort, among policy interventions, that we now bring centre-stage. Both of 
the previous paradigms assumed that we can focus on a single policy intervention in isolation. But 
in the real world, any intervention unfolds not on a tabula rasa, but within a dynamic policy 
‘ecosystem’.  The policy maker needs to be able to anticipate such dynamic effects – and to judge 
which ones will accelerate and reinforce his or her policy ambition, and which ones throw it off 
course.  This is critical for any assessment of ‘what works’ (Room, 2013).    
Policy interventions are launched into a crowded world. These forerunners are not the mere 
detritus of policy enthusiasms long forgotten; in many cases their champions are still at work, 
seeking to broaden their scope and colonise the landscape onto which any new policy is launched. 
Previous interventions shape the fears and hopes and expectations with which the public view the 
new intervention. Around them constituencies and vested interests will have formed that may 
favour or oppose the new intervention. More than this, the new intervention is liable to trigger 
dynamic synergies with some elements of the policy system – forms of ‘co-evolution’ which 
accelerate changes in direction which cannot be understood as the simple consequence or impact 
of the new intervention. Equally however, the new intervention may be unable to break into policy 
ecosystems that are resilient against such new ‘invaders’.   
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It is not just a matter of what policies co-habit a given landscape. What can also matter is the order 
in which they have been introduced. Sequence and timing are important: change them, and the 
ways in which they shape each other will also change. Not only must the search for evidence 
regarding a policy intervention consider how it will work in combination with other policies; it must 
also differentiate according to the order in which those policies are introduced, and having regard 
to the different time scales of their likely effects. 3   
This also means that policy interventions and their potentialities are not fixed, in the sense that the 
chemical composition of gunpowder is fixed. We are interested not in gunpowder per se, but in the 
weapons technologies of which it is no more than a component, and whose potentialities, far from 
fixed, will then be the stuff of desperate arms races. This is an evolutionary version of realism. The 
focus is still on ‘generative mechanisms’, but these are now located not so much within individual 
interventions, but rather in the transformative synergies that develop among these interventions 
and their stakeholders and by which they co-evolve.  
To use the term ‘evolutionary’ perhaps holds risks of misunderstanding. Evolution by natural 
selection is a blind process. In human societies in contrast, people in some degree make their own 
history. They probe and they experiment, not randomly but by systematic testing and learning 
(Bronowski, 1981: Chs 2-4). They re-shape the technologies and institutions of their world, in hope 
of discovering new dynamic synergies from which they can benefit. They strive to develop thereby 
their understanding and their capacities; their control over their lives; their positional advantage 
and leverage. This brings interests and power and politics centre-stage. We will therefore 
henceforth speak not of evolutionary but of transformative realism.  
As we have seen, visual representations can provide powerful images that organise and direct our 
thinking. Figures 2 and 3 provided such images for our first two paradigms. We now seek a 
counterpart for transformative realism, in its simplest or canonical form.   
 
Figure 5: Policy Intervention as Transformative Synergy 
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 Thus for example western advice to Russia in the 1990s, to privatise enterprises even before well-functioning markets 
and financial institutions had been established, is now widely reckoned to have had damaging consequences for Russian 
economy and society.  Or to take a very different example, popular perceptions of health hazards in light of previous 
health panics - and the way that policy makers have handled them – have consequences for subsequent policy 





















In Figure 5, A and B are two policy interventions among many. Each may have been well-
specified by the instigators; nevertheless, each involves multiple layers of policy staff, bringing a 
diversity of interpretations and interests to bear, as Pawson argues.  This process of diversification 
we represent by the variations A1 and A2, B1 and B2.  
No intervention however is isolated: each interacts with others. What now matters is which of the 
four sets of interactions between A1 and A2 on the one hand, B1 and B2 on the other, produces 
the most powerful transformative synergies. In the diagram, we show the relationship of A2 with B1 
as being this favoured pairing, this ‘elective affinity’.  A2 and B1 will each now accelerate the 
flourishing of the other: they progressively dominate A1 and B2, which are re-ordered, 
marginalised, frozen or extinguished altogether.   
Thus by the time we arrive at the time period represented by the bottom row of the diagram, A2 
and B1 dominate.  This is a policy world substantially different from the one with which we began, 
centred on A and B.  Nevertheless, domination by A2 and B1 will not last for ever; further rounds 
of interaction with the larger policy ‘eco-system’ will eventually destabilise them, as new rounds of 
variation and selection are set in motion. In these new rounds, A1 and B2 will however no longer 
be in play, or they will at least have been marginalised: there will be little chance for their potential 
synergies with new partners to be tested. Sequence matters, because it dictates which elements 
are made available for subsequent interaction with others.        
This is how we may visually represent the third of our paradigms of evidence-based policy making, 
in terms of ‘transformative realism’. The task of the policy analyst is to identify the dynamic 
synergies by which A and B and their sub-variants interact with each other and thereby come to 
dominate the changing morphology of the system as a whole. Or, if we take A as the policy 
environment that exists initially, we seek to understand the consequences of a new policy 
intervention B ‘invading’ the system and re-sculpting that environment; or alternatively, revealing 
that this environment is sufficiently stable and resilient against such invasion as to remain in its 
original state.  
    
5. CHOOSING A PARADIGM 
The ontological objections we have raised do not mean the wholesale rejection of EBPM as the 
assessment of impact. Nor do they necessarily mean the entire abandonment of the randomised 
controlled trial. It is a matter of practical judgment, how far these procedures can still provide useful 
guidance, in particular empirical situations.  
Figure 2 will often therefore remain a valuable point of reference. The multiple contingencies of 
Figure 3 and the transformative synergies of Figure 5 are not all-pervasive. Some degree of 
uniformity and stability are preconditions of all policy-making. What must not however be 
overlooked is that they are contingent.   
How should the policy analyst choose which paradigm is appropriate? Figure 6 provides a 
suggested procedure for making that choice. 
This choice is not however just a technical question. It involves judgements as to the significance 
of different dynamic synergies, in relation to the objectives not only of policy makers but also of 
other stakeholders across the communities affected.       
Policy making is a contested process, unavoidably involving interests and power and politics.   
Intrinsic to such struggles is the very definition of different societal ‘problems’. Who is to be blamed 
for these problems and how far is there a responsibility on the public authorities to address them 
(Butler and Drakeford, 2005)?  What standards of evidence are demanded for different problems, 
as a precondition for the investment of public resources? Which problems require a novel response 











The struggle is moreover not just for resources and position but also over the very way that we 
‘see’ the world, both as it is and as it ought to be.  It is therefore, not least, a cultural struggle, over 
the legitimating symbols that give stability to our social world and the cultural hegemony of 
powerful groups.    
It is on just such a stage that policy analysts attempt to develop an evidence base for policy and 
practice. What they provide must therefore take full account of the political economy and 
distribution of power within which struggles over the future of the social and political order are 
being waged. If they sanitise and cloud this task, in the language of technical measurement and 
reified system dynamics, this is itself a political choice.   
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How active and agile are the 
subjects of the intervention?  
How important is it for the 
effectiveness of the 
intervention that they should 
apply and adapt it to their 
circumstances? 
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